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Abstract Increasingly, roles and responsibilities of the
public sector in flood risk management are receiving at-
tention in research and policy. Part of the debate suggests
that allocating risk to the private sector increases efficiency
as it promotes individual adaptation, thereby reducing the
impact if a disaster occurs. In this paper, we analyse the
macroeconomic effects as risk-averse investors take flood
risk into account in their investment decisions. Our case
study is the large Rotterdam area in the Netherlands. Using
a spatial computable general equilibrium model, we find
that the decrease in investments in risky areas leads to a
reduction in capital and production in the large Rotterdam
area, leading to a reduction in potential monetary disaster
losses, but not to a reduction in population. The realloca-
tion of risk reduces the long-term impacts from a flood on
government tax revenues, but it also leads to welfare losses
among households residing in risky regions.
Keywords Flood risk  Natural disasters  Investment
under risk and uncertainty  Spatial computable general
equilibrium
Introduction
The flooding of the Danube in the summer of 2013 and the
winter floods in the UK in January 2014 are just two of many
large-scale flood disasters which recently have hit modern
industrialised economies. Such disasters cause large direct
economic losses as well as ripple effects, leading to economic
losses beyond the location directly affected by the disaster
(Hallegatte 2008). The prospects of increasing future risk due
to socio-economic developments and climate change have
drawn attention to the allocation of risk across and within
countries, and to the allocation of risk between the public and
private sector (Botzen 2013; Jongman et al. 2014; Mechler
et al. 2014; Linnerooth-Bayer and Hochrainer-Stigler 2014).
There is a wide continuum of sharing risk and respon-
sibilities in flood risk management across countries (Aakre
et al. 2010). One of the most extreme cases in terms of
public sector responsibilities is the Netherlands. The
country is one of the most flood prone in the world, with
more than 50 % of its land exposed to flooding (de Moel
et al. 2011). Traditionally, the Dutch government has re-
sponded to the threat of water through a tax-payer funded
system of extremely high safety standards combined with a
public ex-post compensation scheme (Aerts and Botzen
2011). However, the traditional approach has not led to a
decrease in exposure (Husby et al. 2014). For example, due
to the rapid economic growth in the economically impor-
tant Randstad region, a major flood event here would have
major economic consequences for the country as a whole
(Bouwer and Vellinga 2007).
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A number of near-miss flood events, leading to mass
evacuation of population at risk, have led to a rethinking of
the strategy, including a shift in focus towards reducing the
consequences should a flood happen (Kabat et al. 2005).
Adaptive measures in spatial development, such as new
building codes, elevation of buildings or even relocation,
have been introduced as part of a new strategy (Min I & M
2009, 2014). Crucially, the new proposals imply a partial
reallocation of risk, shifting some of the responsibility for
mitigating flood damage from the public to the private
sector. Current research on flood risk management in the
Netherlands revolves around the suitability of these types
of measures for the Dutch situation (Veraart et al. 2014).
A growing body of research argues that it is plausible
that private investors could take flood risk into account in
their investment decisions, decreasing the capital stock in
risky areas (Kousky et al. 2006; Balvers et al. 2009; Hal-
legatte 2011; Baker and Bloom 2013; Barro 2013). Despite
substantial damages in case of a flood and uncertainties
regarding compensation of losses, risk perceptions in the
Netherlands are currently low (Terpstra et al. 2009; Botzen
and van den Bergh 2012). The strong public concern
elicited by recent events (Daniel et al. 2009) suggests that
the Dutch are highly averse towards flood risk. Little is
known about the relative contribution from factors behind
changes in investment behaviour, or about the ensuing
macroeconomic effects. This paper takes on the challenge,
analysing the thought-experiment what if investors started
worrying about flood risk in the Netherlands.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the long-term
economic and welfare effects if investors in the Nether-
lands took flood risk into account. We assume that risk is
directly relevant for capital investments but only indirectly
relevant for households’ decisions. We propose a macroe-
conomic model where investment decisions are based on a
mean-semivariance approach (Markowitz 1959). In our
model, risk-averse investors base their investment deci-
sions on the probability of flooding and on the capital
damage should a flood occur. Simulations of increases in
probability and capital damage allow us to investigate the
conditions necessary to trigger behavioural responses from
investors.
Case study: the large Rotterdam area
The large Rotterdam area is used as a case study. It is a
densely populated region which contains the second big-
gest city in the Netherlands and one of Europe’s largest
ports. Its geographical location on the delta of two major
rivers makes it highly vulnerable to flooding, and it is one
of the few regions in the Netherlands where adaptive
measures in spatial development are being proposed as a
response to future increases in flood risk (Min I & M 2009).
As indicated in Fig. 1, the large Rotterdam area consists
of several dike-rings with varying safety standards. Safety
standards require that the height of the dikes meet a design
level expressed as exceedance probabilities (the probability
that the water level exceeds the top of the dike) or as return
periods (exceedance probability and return period will be
used interchangeably throughout the text). Return periods
vary between 1/10,000 and 1/4000 in areas susceptible to
intrusion from the sea and between 1/2000 and 1/1250 for
areas susceptible to river flooding. Although most
residential and industrial areas are protected by dikes, there
is considerable variation in the probability of flooding
within the region. For example, built-up areas between the
river and the dike are subject to higher flood probabilities
than areas behind the dike (Moel et al. 2014). In addition, it
is likely that the actual probability of flooding in some
areas differs substantially from the safety standards. Dif-
ferences in the spatial concentration of economic activity
as well as differences in inundation depths mean that there
are relatively large sectoral differences in direct damage
between dike-rings.
Methodology
In the economic disaster literature, it is common to dis-
tinguish between direct and indirect effects of flood dis-
asters [see, e.g. Rose (2004) or Merz et al. (2010)]. Direct
effects cover the immediate losses resulting from a certain
level of inundation in a particular area, while indirect ef-
fects are conceptualised as business interruptions, for ex-
ample, when damage to infrastructure interrupts supply
lines resulting in scarcity of intermediate and final goods.
Estimating indirect and long-term effects of disasters is
particularly challenging due to the complex interlinkages
between different sectors and agents within the economy.
Several authors have used computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models to analyse indirect and long-run effects [see
Okuyama (2008) for a review]. These models represent an
economy as systems of equations, where agents in the
economy react to price changes determined by market
equilibria. Income and spending are modelled as circular
flows interconnecting all sectors and regions of the econ-
omy. One major strength of these models is their ability to
incorporate sectoral interlinkages and economic behaviour
of agents (Mechler 2013). Another strength with this model
type is that direct effects are treated as inputs (direct
damage), while indirect effects are model outcomes (gen-
eral equilibrium effects), thereby avoiding double counting
losses.
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RAEM: general description
The model used in this paper—RAEM (regional com-
putable general equilibrium model)—is a recursively dy-
namic spatial computable general equilibrium (SCGE)
model. The model was initially developed for cost-benefit
analyses of transport infrastructure projects in the Nether-
lands (Thissen 2005; Ivanova et al. 2007). It distinguishes
40 regions, corresponding to Dutch NUTS-3 level as de-
fined by Eurostat, and it spans 15 production sectors.
Agents in RAEM are firms, households, a federal govern-
ment, an external trade sector and an investment agent.
RAEM belongs to the New Economic Geography (NEG)
school—a theoretical direction which focuses on how the
spatial pattern in the location of economic production is an
outcome of agglomeration and dispersion forces (Krugman
1991; Fujita and Thisse 1996). A central assumption in
NEG is that firms benefit from a geographical location due
to the presence of increasing returns (monopolistic com-
petition). Households, in turn, gain utility from the variety
of products available in one region. The NEG features thus
allow RAEM to capture feedback effects between pro-
duction and households’ location decisions. These
feedback effects result in clustering of economic activity
and population. The nonlinear mathematical formulation
and increasing returns to scale imply that a small change in
a certain parameter does not necessarily lead to small
changes in the same direction across all sectors.
In each sector, a representative firm uses capital, inter-
mediate goods and labour as inputs to production. Avail-
able capital in each period is defined by the (depreciated)
amount of capital stock from the previous period and new
investments. Firms determine their level of production and
level of inputs by minimising costs for given prices of
production inputs. A share of the production is exported to
other regions, and a share is destined for demand within the
region. The total supply of goods within one region con-
sists of production by firms within the region and imports
and is in equilibrium equal to total domestic demand. Total
domestic demand for a good is the sum of intermediate
demand and final demands. Intermediate demand depends
on the demand from the productive sectors. Final demand
is the sum of government demand, investment demand and
household demand for consumption goods. Household
demand for consumption goods is determined by max-
imising utility given a budget constraint. The consumption
Fig. 1 Large Rotterdam area and NUTS-3 regions in the Netherlands. Dike breaches from the flood scenarios in Jonkhoff et al. (2008) are
indicated in the left part of the figure
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budget is spent on consumption goods and taxes, while
income is a sum of labour and capital income. The utility
maximisation procedure gives rise to a level of regional
equilibrium welfare. Households decide where to locate by
comparing utility across regions, locating in the region
where it can obtain the highest level. The ensuing labour
migration feeds back into firms’ production decisions, both
in the form of labour supply and in the form of final de-
mand for goods.
RAEM: recursive dynamics and capital accumulation
The connection between different time periods in RAEM is
modelled according to a recursively dynamic formulation.
The model consists of a sequence of temporary equilibria
where the equilibria are connected to each other through
capital accumulation over time. Capital KSi;i;t in sector Si in
region i evolves due to capital depreciation d and sector-
and region-specific investment INVSi;i;t. Parameters and
initial values of variables in RAEM are calculated using a
social accounting matrix for the Netherlands from the year
2006. Frequency is yearly, and we analyse the period
t ¼ 2007; :::; 2025.
KSi;i;tþ1 ¼ KSi;i;tð1 dSi;iÞ þ INVSi;i;t ð1Þ
Investment in period t is based on expected capital growth
in t þ 1, which again is a general equilibrium outcome in
period t. Determining capital stock in the next period,
KSi;i;tþ1, as a function of capital growth f ðaRORSi;i;tÞ, in-
vestments in the original formulation of RAEM is sum-
marised by the following equations:
INVSi;i;t ¼ KSi;i;t½f ðaRORSi;i;tÞ þ ð1 dSi;iÞ ð2Þ
aRORSi;i;t ¼ expðRORSi;i;t  ROR0Si;i;tÞ ð3Þ
RORSi;i;t ¼ 1þ
RKSi;i;t
PISi;i;t
þ 1 dSi;i
1þ RGDt
GDPDEFt
ð4Þ
The variables/parameters are: RORSi;i;t: expected rate of
return to capital investments; ROR0Si;i: baseline expected
rate of return; aRORSi;i;t: growth rate of the rate of return
relative to baseline; RKSi;i;t: equilibrium capital growth, or
equally, equilibrium rate of return; PISi;i;t: price of invest-
ment; RGDt: nominal interest rate; GDPDEFt: GDP de-
flator. Using Eq. 1, we can write the region- and sector-
specific investment in terms of the capital stock and as a
function of the expected capital growth above baseline
growth (Eq. 3). The expected rate of return to capital
RORSi;i;t is determined as a function of the equilibrium rate
of return RKSi;i;t, the price of investment PISi;i;t as well as
the adaptive expectations regarding the interest rate.
We incorporate flood risk as a ‘‘correction factor’’ to the
expected rate of return. The risk-adjusted expected rate
return is modelled in line with the mean-variance approach,
developed for risk analysis under downside risk
(Markowitz 1959). In this approach, return to capital is
based on the mean rate of return and volatility. Expected
returns to capital investments are penalised with a risk
premium RPSi;i, determined by the semivariance
VarðRKSi;i;tÞ as well as relative risk-aversion A. The use of
the semivariance captures the notion that only downside
risk is relevant for investors. The parameter of relative risk-
aversion is set to A ¼ 4, indicating a high level of risk-
aversion (Mechler 2004). A flood which occurs with
probability pi can reduce the rate of return with a certain
amount DSi;i. DSi;i thus represents the percentage reduction
in capital growth due to a flood. Defining RKSi;i;t as the
risk-adjusted rate of return, we have
RKSi;i;t ¼ ð1 piÞRKSi;i;t þ piðRKSi;i;t  DSi;iÞ
 A
2
VarðRKSi;i;tÞ
ð5Þ
¼ RKSi;i;t  piDSi;i  A
2
VarðRKSi;i;tÞ ð6Þ
Using Eq. 4, we have
RORSi;i;t ¼ 1þ
RKSi;i;t  piDSi;i  A2VarðRKSi;i;tÞ
PISi;i;t
þ 1 DSi;i
1þ RGDt
GDPDEFt
ð7Þ
The yearly probability of flooding pi corresponds to the
return period in each dike-ring. The true probability of
flooding in each location is also influenced by other vari-
ables such as the probability of dike failure at water levels
below the design standard. By using the return period, we
thus assume that the safety level conveys the relevant in-
formation for the investment decision. DSi;i is calculated
using the direct capital damage per sector from all the
scenarios in Jonkhoff et al. (2008). To obtain NUTS3-level
values for pi and DSi;i we sum over all dike-rings DR:
pi  DSi;i ¼
X
DR
pDR;i  DDR;Si;i ð8Þ
Data
Values for pi and DSi;i are calculated from the data shown
in Table 1 below. Data used for the calculation of the share
of capital at risk, DSi;i are obtained from Jonkhoff et al.
(2008). Jonkhoff et al. (2008) investigated both direct and
indirect damages for a number of dike breaches in the re-
gion of Rotterdam (see Fig. 1). Total direct capital damages
were calculated using the Dutch Damage and Casualty
model HIS-SSM (Kok et al. 2005). This model combines
568 T. G. Husby et al.
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modelled maximum inundation depth and a range of asset-
type specific depth-damage functions and maximum dam-
age values to estimate potential losses from a specific flood
scenario, on a 100 m  100 m resolution. The damage
estimates represent losses at replacement values and in-
clude an additional 5 % on top of the direct damages to
represent part of the indirect losses. The HIS-SSM model is
extensively used by government and research organizations
for the exploration of flood risk management policies (e.g.
de Bruijn and der Doef 2011; Kind 2014). Table 1 reports
the direct sectoral capital damage, as a percentage of the
total capital stock in each sector, from the flood scenarios
in Jonkhoff et al. (2008). The table also indicates the safety
level (return period) of the dike-rings in the scenarios.
Simulations and scenarios
In order to investigate the sensitivity of model results to
different values of pi and DSi;i, we run a number of different
scenarios, increasing probability, damage or both. By
varying the parameters in Eq. 6, we thus simulate
macroeconomic effects as risk-averse investors expect an
increase in probability or damage or both. As mentioned
earlier, it is unlikely that flood risk is currently a factor in
private decision making such as investment decisions. We
define our baseline scenario as a scenario, in which in-
vestments are unaffected by risk. In Eq. 6, this entails
setting pi ¼ DSi;i ¼ 0. By increasing pi we simulate a
situation where investors believe protection decreases
relative to its current level. Similarly, increases in DSi;i
imply that investors believe that the share of capital at risk
increases relative to the current situation.
To illustrate how the modified investment behaviour
affects disaster impacts, we simulate one of the dike breach
scenarios from Jonkhoff et al. (2008). This scenario is
dike-ring 14 in the region of Rotterdam, with breach points
indicated in Fig. 1. We simulate a flood in t ¼ 2016, as-
suming, as the original study, a disruption period of two
months. The flood is incorporated in RAEM as a partial
reduction in available land, housing stock, capital stock and
labour force. We interpret the reduction in labour force in
RAEM as casualties.
Results from the case study
Ex-ante results: changes in labour force, production
and unemployment
Figure 2 shows the impacts from the modified investment
behaviour on labour force, production and unemployment
in the region of Rotterdam under all scenarios until 2015.
The shaded area indicates the range of impacts across
scenarios on each variable. As shown by the green shaded
area, their production declines by between 0 and 1.2 %
relative to baseline production. However, as shown by the
red shaded area in the figure, labour force is reduced by
between 0 and 0.1 % relative to baseline labour. As shown
by the blue shaded area, unemployment increases between
0 and 2 % relative to baseline unemployment. Our results
thus suggest that the reduction in production is about ten
times higher than the reduction in labour force. The re-
duction in production is also accompanied by a relatively
large increase in unemployment. As such, our results
Table 1 Return period of each
dike-ring and the sectoral
capital damage from the
scenarios in Jonkhoff et al.
(2008)
Dike ring 14 15 16 17 20 21 22
Probability 1/10,000 1/2000 1/2000 1/4000 1/4000 1/2000 1/2000
Sector Damage as percentage of capital
Agriculture 0.243 1.619 1.082 0.002 0.013 0.0250 0.068
Mining and quarrying 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Manufacturing 0.135 0.080 0.130 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.103
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.213 0.0123 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.0218
Construction 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.0018 0.000 0.000 0.003
Trade and repair consumer services 0.097 0.032 0.039 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.035
Hotels, restaurants and cafe 0.211 0.069 0.084 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.077
Transport 0.064 0.092 0.109 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.031
Storage and communication 0.176 0.253 0.298 0.013 0.003 0.005 0.085
Financial services 0.165 0.099 0.067 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.043
Business services, renting, real estate 0.232 0.139 0.094 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.06
Public administration 0.405 0.140 0.174 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.197
Education 0.248 0.086 0.107 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.121
Health and social work 0.019 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.033
Culture, sports and leisure 0.011 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018
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suggest that the decrease in population is only minor de-
spite the worsening of economic conditions.
Direct, short-term effects: capital destruction
and casualties
In the previous subsection, we showed that the decrease in
investments in the large Rotterdam areas led to lower
production, but only to small reductions in labour force.
The decrease in production leads to a reduction in capital
stock, limiting the capital damage of a flood. However,
there are only limited reductions in the number of casu-
alties in case of a flood. This is illustrated in Tables 2 and 3
which show percentage reductions in direct capital damage
and casualties in the scenarios relative to the original
model without the modified investment behaviour. There
are minor reductions in capital damage in all scenarios
where DSi;i stays at its current level, while the damage in
scenarios where DSi;i increases by a factor of 10, direct
damage is reduced by less than 1 % relative to the baseline
scenario. In scenarios where DSi;i increases by a factor of
100, capital damage is reduced by between 3 and 5 %.
However, the reductions in casualties are almost identical
across all scenarios.
Indirect and long-term effects: welfare losses and tax
revenue
Welfare losses, calculated as equivalent variation (Hicks
1943), over the time span 2007–2025 are depicted in Fig. 3.
Here equivalent variation refers to welfare losses as a
percentage of household’s yearly income. The time period
covers both the ex-ante period as well as long-term ex-post.
In a given year (horizontal axis), the isolines show the
reduction in welfare as pi increases. Movements along the
vertical axis thus show how impacts vary with different
probabilities of flooding, while movements along the
horizontal axis illustrate how impacts develop over time.
The left panel shows results from scenarios where DSi;i in
Eq. 6 is held at its current level, the centre panel shows
results from scenarios where DSi;i increases by a factor of
10, and the right panel shows results from scenarios where
DSi;i increases by a factor of 100.
The left panel, which shows results from scenarios
where damage is kept constant, suggests that welfare losses
due to the modified investment behaviour are minor. Be-
fore the flood, welfare losses amount to maximum 0.01 %
of household income. After the flood, the decrease in
welfare corresponds to maximum 0.08 % of household
income. However, the figure also suggests welfare losses
are almost entirely due to the flood. Welfare losses are
substantially larger in scenarios where DSi;i increase by a
factor of 10 (centre panel), but the increase in welfare
losses is not proportional to the increase in DSi;i. Welfare
losses before 2016 are maximum 0.05 % of household
income.
The centre panel shows that changes in probability
have some effect on welfare losses: for the current level
of probability, there are welfare decreases by about 0.1 %
and for cases where probability increases by a factor of
100 welfare decreases by more than 0.25 %. The right
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Fig. 2 Impacts on labour force, production and unemployment in the
region of Rotterdam across all scenarios. The red shaded area shows
changes in labour force, the green shaded area shows changes in
production, and the blue shaded area shows changes in
unemployment
Table 2 Percentage reductions in direct capital damage in the sce-
nario run relative to the original model
pi multiplied by Dsi;i multiplied by
1 10 100
1 0.00 0.07 3.23
10 0.01 0.07 3.25
100 0.03 0.09 3.40
1000 0.07 3.40 4.81
Table 3 Percentage reductions in casualties in the scenario run
relative to the original model
pi multiplied by Dsi;i multiplied by
1 10 100
1 0.02 0.02 0.09
10 0.02 0.02 0.09
100 0.02 0.02 0.09
1000 0.02 0.09 0.12
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panel, which shows results from scenarios where DSi;i
increases by a factor of 100, shows a further decrease in
welfare, amounting to around 1 % of income before the
flood, reaching a maximum of above 3 % of income
around 2025. The right panel suggests that welfare losses
are almost entirely driven by the modified investment
behaviour. Losses accelerate over time and are mainly
driven by DSi;i (although flatter isolines towards the end
of the time interval indicate that differences in prob-
abilities become more important over time). The indirect
effects of a flood have negative impacts on the govern-
ments’ fiscal position in the sense that a drop in pro-
duction reduces tax income. However, as shown above,
the modified investment behaviour diverts production
away from the region of Rotterdam, reducing the impact
of a flood and, as a consequence, the indirect effects.
This is illustrated in Fig. 4 where the left panel shows
results for scenarios where damage in Eq. 6 is kept at its
current level. The modified investment behaviour leads to
a slight increase in tax revenue before the flood (around 1
% higher than baseline tax revenue by 2015). The flood
leads to an immediate drop in tax revenue in all sce-
narios. Interestingly, for scenarios where probability in-
creases by a factor of 10 or 100, the increasing isolines
suggest that the flood has the effect of setting the econ-
omy on to a negative growth path with declining tax
revenues over time. The middle and right panel of Fig. 4
suggest that diversion of investment away from the re-
gion of Rotterdam has in fact a positive effect on tax
revenues. This suggests that the modified investment
behaviour and the ensuing outflow of productive capital
from the region of Rotterdam limits the impact of a flood
on public finances.
Discussion
The possibility of future increases in flood risk has inten-
sified the debate on the roles and responsibilities of public
and private sector agents in flood risk management. The
discussion is particularly relevant for our case study—the
large Rotterdam area in the Netherlands. Traditionally,
Dutch flood risk management has focused almost entirely
on prevention and public ex-post loss compensation. This
strategy can be explained by high concentration of
population and economic assets in flood-prone areas,
leading to covariate risk in the case of a flood disaster
(Mechler and Bouwer 2014). Large and quasi-irreversible
investment costs and the public good features of flood
protection justify an important role of the Dutch govern-
ment in flood risk management in the Netherlands (Fan-
khauser et al. 1999). Attempts of introducing private
property insurance are complicated by high transaction
costs, uncertainties related to risk assessment and limited
markets for risk-sharing products (Froot 2001). It is,
however, increasingly argued that the traditional approach
should be complemented with measures limiting the con-
sequences in case of a flood (Kabat et al. 2005). Answering
calls for a more integrated approach, the Dutch government
has made efforts in incorporating, for example, spatial
planning measures in flood risk management policies (van
den Hurk et al. 2014; Min I & M 2014). Crucially, the new
approach entails a partial shift in the allocation of risk,
where private sector agents to some extent are responsible
for covering their own risk. However, as the recent rejec-
tion of mandatory flood insurance for home owners has
shown, the introduction of market-based instruments is
likely to face challenges. In this paper, we have attempted
2010 2015 2020 2025 2010 2015 2020 2025 2010 2015 2020 2025
Change (%) from baseline welfare
Current
x100
   x1000
Change (%) from baseline welfare Change (%) from baseline welfare
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 fl
oo
di
ng
Potential capital damage
−0.07 −0.06 −0.05 −0.04 −0.03 −0.02 −0.01 −0.25 −0.2 −0.15 −0.1 −0.05 −3 −2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −0.5
H
ig
h
Lo
w
HighLow
Fig. 3 Changes in household welfare in the large Rotterdam area
across scenarios. The vertical axis shows pi, while the horizontal axis
shows year. The left panel shows results from scenarios where DSi;i in
Eq. 6 is held at its current level, the centre panel shows results from
scenarios where DSi;i increases by a factor of 10, and the right panel
shows results from scenarios where DSi;i is increased by a factor of
100
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to inform the debate by studying macroeconomic impli-
cations of a possible incentive effect from increased risk
awareness.
The goal of this article was to investigate the long-term
economic and welfare effects if risk-averse investors in the
Netherlands took flood risk into account in their investment
decisions. By increasing the values of the key parameters
probability of flooding and potential capital damage, we
shed some light on the potential investor responses to two
aspects of flood risk and on the ensuing macroeconomic
effects. More specifically, we analysed impacts on pro-
duction, on population and on household welfare in the
large Rotterdam area when risk-averse investors started
worrying about downside risk in the region.
Our results suggest that combinations of increases in
probability and capital damage can cause investors to divert
investments away from the large Rotterdam area. Yet, the
decline in investment has a dual impact. On the one hand,
there is a reduction in productive capital in the region, re-
ducing capital damage in case of a flood by as much as 5 %.
The reductions in productive capital also reduce the impact
from a flood on tax revenues. On the other hand, the de-
crease in economic activities also leads to an increase in
unemployment and prices of consumption goods, causing
welfare losses among households in the large Rotterdam.
According to our results, these welfare losses can amount to
more than 3 % of yearly household income. Overall,
although potential disaster losses can be reduced, it is
questionable whether diversion of investments away from
risky areas is desirable due to the negative side effects. This
resonates with conclusions drawn in other studies (Linne-
rooth-Bayer and Amendola 2000; Ligtvoet et al. 2009).
Turning to the sensitivity of our results to increases in
key parameters, our simulation exercises suggest that
investment decisions are particularly sensitive to increased
capital damage (higher DSi;i). If the potential capital dam-
age increases to close to 100 %, anything else than very
high levels of protection is likely to cause large decreases
in investments. This reflects a frequently raised concern in
the current Dutch policy debate: high and increasing ex-
posure justifies very high safety levels. Projected future
increases in the concentration of economic activity in
vulnerable areas such as the region of Rotterdam provide
arguments for increasing the protection in these areas
(Kind 2014).
The point of departure for our analysis is that, while
there is a good understanding about flood risk in the
Netherlands, risk is currently of limited importance for
household-level adaptation. This is in line with conclusions
drawn in empirical studies that argue that flood risk is a
relatively minor concern for people in the Netherlands
(Terpstra et al. 2009). Indeed, international experience
shows that in the absence or a long time after an event, risk
is likely to have a limited direct impact on household de-
cision making (see Slovic 1987). For example, Kunreuther
and Pauly (2006) argue that both probabilities and potential
government assistance are of limited importance in
household decisions on whether or not to buy insurance.
Most importantly, risk may play a limited role in house-
holds location decision (Hunter 2005). Studies examining
housing market impacts of floods show that risk percep-
tions are systematically increased by concrete events, yet
only temporarily so. Such studies find that disaster events
such as floods lead to a temporary housing price difference
between risky and non-risky areas (e.g. Bin and Landry
2013; Atreya et al. 2013).
Overall, lack of actionable risk perceptions and strong
incentives may lead to increasing exposure over time,
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Fig. 4 Changes in tax revenues of the government across scenarios.
The vertical axis shows pi, while the horizontal axis shows year. The
left panel shows results from scenarios where DSi;i in Eq. 6 is held at
its current level, the centre panel shows results from scenarios where
DSi;i increases by a factor of 10, and the right panel shows results
from scenarios where DSi;i increases by a factor of 100
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meriting considerations regarding policy-induced reallo-
cation of risk from the public to the private sector. We have
analysed a situation where risk is directly relevant only for
investors, while households are indirectly affected through
supply-side adjustments and ensuing price effects. How-
ever, as our results suggest, the indirect effects, reflected as
lower production and increased unemployment in areas at
risk, do not necessarily provide strong enough signals for
households to relocate. This is in line with results from
other studies (Glaeser and Gyourko 2005; Vigdor 2008).
The negative welfare effects associated with the realloca-
tion of risk voice the equity concerns raised by Linnerooth-
Bayer and Amendola (2000).
It is argued that the current policy regime in the
Netherlands provides little incentives for individual adap-
tation (Botzen and van den Bergh 2008; Aerts and Botzen
2011; Filatova 2014). Our model results suggest that a
partial reallocation of risk can provide incentives for in-
dividual adaptation. On the one hand, our results suggest
that the direct capital damage from a flood can be reduced
by diverting investments away from areas at risk. Provision
of information about hazard as well as information about
the effectiveness of individual adaptation measures could
help private sector agents in making decisions on their own
exposure to flood risk. On the other hand, ensuring the
public good characteristics of protection is an important
goal for policy makers: publicly financed prevention can
help ensuring that safety does not become a good primarily
enjoyed by the privileged.
In order to make the analysis clear and the model
tractable, we have relied on a number of simplifying as-
sumptions. Firstly, as a country-level analysis would re-
quire additional data on flood damage from other regions,
we have limited our analysis to the large Rotterdam area.
Secondly, we have followed the convention of modelling a
representative regional household who does not react to the
level or changes in risk. This allows us to observe changes
in average values, but we are unable to provide detailed
analyses of changes in the socio-economic composition of
a region. We leave these open questions for future research.
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